Mediating the Syria revolt: how new media technologies change the development of social movements and conflicts by Brownlee, BJ
1 
 
 
Mediating the Syrian revolt: how new media technologies change the development of 
social movements and conflicts 
Chapter in edited book by Raymond Hinnebusch, The Syrian Uprising: Roots and Trajectories, Taylors and Francis, 
2017. 
 
 
“Enemies are many…the revolution is one…and it will continue” 
Banner in the city of Kafranbel, Syria (January 3, 2014) 1 
  
“Ever tried. Ever failed. No Matter. Try Again. Fail Again. Fail Better!” 
Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho (1983) 
 
Introduction 
The Syrian uprising broke out at the time of what many defined as the ‘Arab Spring’, a 
period of revolutionary ferment, popular mobilisation and protest against authoritarian 
and corrupt regimes in the Arab world (Anderson, 2011).2 However, Syria’s revolt has 
been very different from the others in that the unrest of the initial months has driven the 
country from an uprising to an armed conflict. These conditions have made Syria a fertile 
ground for Islamic fundamentalist groups, often with conspicuous participation of foreign 
fighters, waging a highly unorthodox jihad aimed at establishing a Dar al-Islam or new 
caliphate, ruled by a strict, reactionary interpretation of sharia law. Such a complex 
scenario would not be complete, without mentioning the role of regional powers, like the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, Turkey, Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC) that have contributed with military support and fighters, and international super 
powers that, though not taking an active part in conflict, have financed the opposing 
sides.3 By doing so, these countries have avoided direct participation in the civil war, 
engaging in a multisided proxy war, in which media wars have played a salient part.4 
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The unwrapping of Syria’s chapter of the Arab Spring has been influenced by an 
unprecedented and overwhelming role that the new media technologies have proved 
playing since the early days of the uprising and to a large extent, one can argue, in the 
years that predated its outbreak.5 The predominate role that the new media played at the 
time of the uprising was not the effect of a deus ex-machina but the result of years of 
experimentation and maturation, where Syrians were actively employing the digital tools 
to access information, network and disseminate campaigns on social and political issues. 
As the World Bank data shows, between 2002 and 2012 Syrian cell phone usage rates 
increased by 2,347 percent, compared to the 83 percent in the US during the same time 
period (Kilcullen, 2013). Moreover, Syria’s Internet penetration increased by 883 percent, 
greater than in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The third-generation media, that is to say, 
satellite channels and social media networks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have 
proved particularly influential in promoting social mobilisation. These tools have deeply 
affected the spark and development of the revolt, its narrative, the making of news and 
the management of the conflict. The extensive use of the new technologies at the time of 
the uprising is not the expression of a phenomenon limited to a single country, Syria or 
to a region, the Arab world, but the expression a wider phenomenon: the last decade has 
witnessed a global rise in social mobilisation and protest movements, all heavily 
influenced in their tactics and strategies by the employment of the new media (Shirky, 
2011).  Movements like Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados of Puerta del Sol and those 
of Syntagma Sqaure or of Brazil’s 10-cent movement have been framed as mobilisations 
against austerity measures caused by the economic crisis while those in the Arab world 
as mobilisations against authoritarian regimes (Brownlee, Ghiabi, 2016) and yet, both 
movements denote a central theme, namely that contemporary society is turning into a 
“movement society” (Meyer, Tarrow, 1998) as an effect of the development of new media 
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that is offering citizens more opportunities to contest political authority and economic 
inequalities worldwide. 
This paper examines the significant and multi-faced role that the new media 
technologies played in the course of the Syrian revolt, with the aim of reflecting on how 
the new information technologies have changed people’s power, journalism and conflicts 
in many and diversified ways. In Syria, the new media technologies have been a game 
changer under many points of view: they have been used by citizens to vent their 
frustrations and sense of oppression; they have been employed to organise protest 
movements, to attack the regime’s propaganda and to reach the international audience. 
On the other hand, the regime has also used the new media to launch a counteroffensive, 
mobilising a counter response to the anti-regime propaganda, strengthening the sentiment 
of its loyalists and deploying a digital army charged with spying people’s activities online, 
identifying and arresting them. Indeed, the confrontation between the regime and the 
rebels has not occurred in streets and battlefields only, but in the virtual space as well. 
The extremist Islamic groups operating in Syria have also resorted to the new media to 
elicit fear, ask for ransom for hostages and recruit new followers.  
 For practical reasons the analysis of Syria’s media field is here presented as a 
three-phase development, which follows the evolution of the revolt: the initial period of 
protests and demonstrations; the country’s entry into a state of armed conflict; and the 
current draining stalemate of the civil war. The demarcation between these phases has 
been more gradual and less evident than it might appear in this analysis. Nonetheless, a 
framework that helps to understand the changing role of the new media in the 
development of the Syrian revolution may prove useful to offer a more thorough 
understanding of the events in Syria and reflect on the enormous potential that the new 
media technologies are offering people in closed regimes around the globe, as well as the 
dangers and harm that these same tools produce when handled by authoritarian 
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governments, terrorist organizations and not least, international media outlets, often more 
concerned with sensationalist reporting rather than fundamental ethical principles. 
 
Phase 1. The spark of the uprising and the “syndrome of Hama” 
The Facebook and YouTube effects 
Unlike Egypt that had enjoyed a surprisingly high and unfettered rate of network 
connectivity before 2011, Syrian web surfers had faced sophisticated technical 
infrastructures of censorship and wiretapping that applied to the online space as much as 
to the offline one (Kilcullen, 2013). When, at the early stages of the uprising, the regime 
adopted a more relaxed and comprehensive approach to the digital media, both social 
networks, Facebook and YouTube, were flooded by users and viewers. This coincided 
with the regime’s decision to lift the ban on their use in February 2011, a move that 
appeased the new generations and that allowed the regime to monitor and tail all possible 
anti-regime activists (Baiazy, 2012). 
On the 15th of March, 2011, a number of social rallies gathered through the main 
streets and squares of several Syrian cities, in response to the call for mobilisation of a 
Facebook page “the Syrian revolution 2011”.6 A few days later, the page counted more 
than 41,000 fans (Baiazy, 2012). Since that date, the Syrian Revolution Facebook page 
became the revolution’s main manifesto and coordination network. Each Friday, the first 
day of the weekend in Syria, the page called for people to rally in defence of fundamental 
rights and values and to comfort the relatives of those who had lost a family member in 
the course of the unrest (Fares, 2015). The Facebook page, imitating the Egyptian call of 
Day of Rage, became instrumental to communicate with citizens, motivate people to take 
part in the protests and create a sort of social glue through which people could find support 
in each other and acquire a sense of common destiny. The great success of the page, 
5 
 
symbolised by growing number of followers, led to the opening of many other pages 
created in support to the Syrian revolt, like “the Syria Free Press” on February 20, 2011, 
“the Sham News Network” on March 18, 2011 and “the Ugarit Network” on April 2, 
2011(Fares, 2015).  One year later the number of online pages had reached the thousands. 
Facebook was the springboard for the spark of the Syrian uprising. Facebook pages were 
used as news-bulletins, building bridges with other activists in Arab countries and abroad, 
as well as simply sharing opinions. Facebook pages were very popular also among pro-
regime supporters, sharing videos on the violence perpetuated by the rebels and uploading 
videos about the regime’s military grandeur and patriotic sacrifice. However, with time 
and with the changing political scene, activists turned to other social media tools like 
YouTube, Skype and Twitter. 
In this phase, from March to July of 2011, the role performed by social media was 
inspired by a collective memory of the mass killing of civilians (between 10,000 to 40,000 
deaths) by hands of the government in Hama 1982 which had received little media 
coverage.7 Determined to prevent a recurrence of this episode, Syrians held on to their 
smartphones and cameras and kept filming every protest and peaceful march and their 
brutal repression by the regime. The act of uploading photos or videos documenting the 
regime's brutality paradoxically encouraged more people to join civil resistance despite 
the high degree of risk and uncertainty. Doug McAdam defines this process as "cognitive 
liberation", an evolution that individuals experience when put in front of a public 
condemnation of the regime's wrong doings, which breaks the barrier of apathy that had 
characterized them that far and drives them to reject the perceived injustice collectively 
(McAdam, 1982). Events like the regime's harsh punishment of the children of Dera'a and 
the torture of the 13-year-old boy Hamza al Khateb, acted as a "catalytic event", the click 
or fuse that lit the revolt.8 These events exposed the regime's viciousness on a national 
level via alternative news outlets that the regime was unable to block, and which had 
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developed over the years prior the uprising. What marked the difference between the 
events in Hama of 1982 and those of 2011 was the public condemnation they received 
through the online media, no longer merely accounts told from mouth to mouth as had 
been in past.  
 In a year’s time YouTube surpassed Facebook’s popularity, which actually relied 
on YouTube’s videos posting on its pages. These networks are closely interconnected, as 
videos are usually uploaded on YouTube, shared on Facebook and then referred to on 
Twitter. The number of YouTube videos uploaded on the Syrian revolution, 
approximately 2 million in the first two years of the revolt, has made some refer to the 
Syrian revolt as the ‘YouTube revolution’, as opposed to the Egyptian ‘Facebook 
revolution’ or the Iranian Green Movement ‘Twitter’s revolution’ (Khatib, 2014). The 
nature of the page drove its success, as everyone with a phone or any rudimentary 
technology was able to post his/her video of the revolution, everyone contributing to 
sharing his/her own experience of the revolution. By doing so, YouTube became an online 
archive of homemade videos. Based on this, Fares Abed held that the “Syrian revolution 
is the most documented revolution in history” (Baiazy, 2012). However, given the still 
limited number of Internet surfers in Syria, their relevance grew when the information 
and footage uploaded on these social media was portrayed on satellite TV channels, the 
mass communication medium par excellence. Hence, it is when these two media, social 
media and satellite TV interacted that the Syrian news coverage reached the highest 
audience rates (Baiazy, 2012). This made the work of Syrian activists vital for 
international media reporting, but it also helped the aim of the revolution, given it an 
international echo.  
The nature of video-documentation on the Syrian revolt is wide and diversified. 
Some testify to the creativity and humour of the Syrian people even in dark times, like 
Top Goon: Diaries of the Little Dictator, a web-based series puppet show that went on 
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air in 2011 mocking the President Bashar and his violent repression of protesters.9 A wide 
number of videos testify to the resilience of the Syrian people, like the women of 
Salamiyah, who organised sit-ins at home, where women in disguise and holding banners 
with political slogans are filmed and later posted on the web.10 By doing so, women avoid 
the risk of being arrested and support the cause of the revolution. Other videos witness 
the courageous demonstrations that ignited the uprising, the conflict between regime and 
rebels, the hard days of people under siege.  
In Syria, online media represented cheap means to communicate, fast ways to 
coordinate action and what is more the only space where Syrians could express their 
dissatisfaction and call for action. In other Arab countries, citizens relied on social media 
to coordinate action, but expressed their dissatisfaction through massive gatherings in 
public spaces like Habib Bourghiba Street in Tunis, Tahrir Square in Cairo, Sittin Square 
in Sanaa and Pearl roundabout in Manama. In Syria, instead, the lack of large protest 
spaces, combined to the repressive security and military system, pushed the concentration 
of protests to the peripheries (Dera’a). Damascus and Aleppo, the two main urban 
agglomeration, were largely unencumbered by political rallies, at least in the initial stages 
of the revolt. For this reason, the new media were used to bridge these gaps and create a 
unifying force that, albeit online, was capable of keeping the revolution alive.  
 
Virtual conflicts 
The extent to which the new media have dominated the development of the Syrian 
conflict is expressed by the establishment of the regime’s “Syrian Electronic Army” 
(SEA), a group of IT specialists specifically recruited to fight back the anti-regime online 
mobilisation. The group, which defines itself as “enthusiastic Syrian youths who could 
not stay passive towards the massive distortion of facts about the recent uprising in Syria”, 
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was launched in 2011 to operate digital spamming campaigns and attacks on individuals, 
groups and organisations undermining the legitimacy of the Syrian government (Fowler, 
2013). The regime had always kept a close eye on the Internet, being the last Arab country 
to allow public access and even then, being very cautious at permitting unlimited access 
to all its pages. However, at the onset of the uprising in Syria, it became clear that new 
media were driving the social mobilisation and that to combat the anti-regime sentiment 
it was not sufficient to crush it in the streets and squares but it was necessary to wear it 
out online. The group, operated on different fronts: hacking and shutting down Syrian 
opposition websites, spamming popular Syrian opposition websites with pro-regime 
comments; uploading fabricated videos on YouTube to discredit protestors (Khamis et al. 
2015). When activists were identified and arrested, security forces extracted information 
with the use of force, obtaining usernames and passwords of activists’ social media 
accounts, which would be passed to the Syrian Electronic Army to post pro-regime 
slogans on their pages and contact the user’s friends (Baiazy, 2012). The regime’s IT 
army worked in close collaboration with the Syrian Security Communication branch, 
codenamed 225, the hub for all telecommunication security in Syria, intensifying the 
electronic surveillance system by controlling text-messaging, e-mails and Internet use, 
and blocking messages that might contain terms such as “revolution”, “meeting” or 
“demonstration”.11 All these aspects are not usually sufficiently emphasised when 
referring to the Syrian conflict, though constituting an important component, one that has 
paralleled the front-line clashes in the virtual world, through spy war and cyber espionage.  
 
 The boom in net-art 
Social media have not only provided space for news coverage of the Syrian revolt, 
they have also opened venues of artistic expressions of resistance. While violence seems 
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to dominate most of the cyberspace coverage of the Syrian conflict, local artists have 
transformed the Internet into a virtual gallery to exhibit their works of art. The Syrian net-
art is an innovative phenomenon of cultural production that encompasses visual art, mash-
ups, cartoons, jokes, songs and web-series. One example is represented by the “Raised 
Hands Campaign”, a reaction to a campaign by the regime to gain popular support which 
entailed the putting up of billboards showing a colourful hand and the slogan “young or 
old, I’m with the law” (ṣaghir aw kabir, ana ma‘ a al-qanuun), “whether a boy or a girl, 
I’m with the law” (ṣabiy aw fatà, ana ma‘a al qanuun). Syrians reacted to this Orwellian 
atmosphere by reusing the same slogans and images and by posting them across the 
different social media with new slogans that said “I’m free” (ana hurr), “I lost my shoe” 
(“faqadhtu hidha’i"- suggesting it had been thrown at the dictator). The popularity of the 
digital version of the “Raised Hands Campaign”, as opposed to the offline one, obliged 
the regime to react to this manipulation and replace the old banners with new ones that 
displayed rhetorically more neutral mottos like “I’m with Syria. My demands are your 
demands” (“Ana ma‘a suriya. Maṭlabi huwwa maṭlabik”). Once more, social media were 
filled up with the new version of the slogan, which read “I’m with Syria. My demands 
are freedom” (“Ana ma suriya. Maṭlabi al-hurriya”).  
As the scholar Donatella Della Ratta observes, this campaign, like many others, 
shows how Syrians did not accept the official rhetoric of the regime any longer, but they 
challenged it, regaining control over the world of public symbols (Della Ratta, 2012). The 
art of resilience also emerged in the powerful canvas of Monif Ajaj and Yasser Abu 
Hamad, the banners of Kafranbel a stronghold of resistance in the centre of Syria; likewise 
it can be identified in the Facebook page “Meals Under Siege”, created by the people of 
Homs to share improvised and creative recipes with the scarce ingredients at their 
disposal. Hence, social media are allowing Syrians to rediscover their creativity, once 
monopolised or censored by the elite-driven cultural production. By posting the arts and 
10 
 
crafts online, with no regime-interference and no censorship, this user-generated art, 
establishes a new relationship vis à vis power and state authority and a new connection 
between ordinary citizens and artists (Della Ratta, 2012). 
 
 Phase 2. From uprising to conflict, from media activism to citizen journalism 
When it became clear that popular demonstrations were not ending and that the 
regime was holding on to power, as had been the case in Tunisia and Egypt, a military 
confrontation between rebels and regime began. Protestors started arming themselves, 
guerrilla groups emerged and the regime progressively lost control of numerous towns 
and cities. With the formation of a civilian democracy movement and the creation of the 
Free Syrian Army, formed by defected Syrian officers, the Syrian uprising progressively 
moved from a popular uprising to a civil conflict. The change of setting had an impact on 
the media scene. Activists across Syria organised in Local Coordination Committees, 
with media centres providing local news coverage and sharing information. This phase is 
here identified as a period that goes from fall 2011 to the beginning of 2013 and ISIS’s 
expansion within Syrian borders. 
New media, in this context, progressively acquired a new status, one which was 
not linked exclusively to informing and documenting events, but that had a positive 
impact on the organisation and management of community. In this second phase, Syrians 
joined the revolt by fighting and by “doing journalism”, signalling a transition from 
“media activism” – conceived as a form  of militant journalism, to “citizen journalism”, 
a form of participation that supported social development, focused on the needs of the 
domestic audience, rather than the international one.  
This new type of journalism, also known as “public”, “participatory”, 
“democratic”, or “street” journalism, assigns the role of collecting, reporting, analysing 
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and disseminating news and information to citizens. Citizens take up this role to 
compensate the poor performance of state’s news outlets and to dispel the distorted 
propaganda offered by the regime’s own journalists.  
The profession of citizen journalists has been the object of extensive, though not 
exhaustive, debates. Whether one considers it a contribution from an “insider” to the 
making of news, or a courageous effort by the people, yet one lacking professionalism, 
the role of citizen journalism remains crucial to the understanding of the media landscape 
during the Syrian uprising. The latter bears some truth when one looks at the context in 
which activists offered media coverage strongly imbued with political value and militant 
language, casting doubt on the training and lack of coordination that these individuals had 
when compared with traditional media institutions.  
In this sense, media tools become weapons to protect the cause of the revolution. 
A media activist interviewed in Gaziantep during a media training session argued: “My 
aim is to use the media to help my people topple Bashar. Why shouldn’t I serve the 
interests of my people and of myself? I have been silenced for my whole life by the 
regime, now I need to have my say”.12 This attitude, shared by many and evident in the 
early media production, has changed with time, both because of the endurance of the 
conflict and because of technical and financial support received by media activists from 
foreign powers. Media development is one of the sectors that foreign powers have 
consistently supported in Syria, with the alleged objective of securing professional media 
coverage of the conflict, as well as teaching a new profession to the new generations. The 
practice of media assistance projects, funded by international actors like the EC and 
USAID progressively turns into the strategy for foreign powers to intervene indirectly, a 
form of soft power, which supports civil society while pushing for regime change.  
The Syrian revolution is teaching that the world is changing and with it the making 
of news. The status quo of traditional journalism is not exclusively reserved for accredited 
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journalists or established media outlets acting as media gatekeepers as in the past. Today, 
potentially every man or woman with a cell-phone camera in his/her hand can contribute 
and even question news coverage. News has become more visual and emphatic, including 
images of death and destruction, engaging the audience even more.  
If in the initial stage of the uprising – or actually prior to it – the renaissance of 
the media landscape apparently developed through digital platforms, with the passing of 
time it moved toward the revaluation of traditional forms. The conflict had limited 
people’s access to the Internet, making traditional media like newspaper, radio and TV 
channels regain popularity as forms of expression which were not only meant to inform 
or boost support, but also entertain and educate. Moreover, social media, though popular 
and welcoming all types of content, were not affordable for all, whether for generational 
gaps, high cost of devices and the limits imposed by a conflict that had caused food, water 
shortages and electricity restrictions. 
 
Newspapers 
Underground newspapers first appeared in Syria towards the end of 2011, marking 
an important change in the panorama of the Syrian revolution.13 The publication and 
distribution of periodicals produced a symbolic rupture with the monopoly of information 
that the regime had imposed up to then, offering alternatives to the propaganda operated 
by the government. The production of newspapers as well as radio channels represented 
that necessary step that bridged the pre-revolutionary phase in which alternative news 
circulated only online and were thereby limited to those accessing the web, to a post-
uprising phase in which the news horizon expands to the offline production and is 
accessible to the wider public.  
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Between 2011 and 2012, a dozen of independent grassroots newspapers, often 
with their online version, were printed in Syria, like Suryitna (Our Syria) Oxygen, 
Hurriyat (Freedoms), Enab Baladi (Local Grapes), only to mention a few.14 The 
production and distribution of these periodicals jeopardised the lives of those involved in 
the project, especially those working in the distribution of copies within pro-
governmental areas.15  
Today the number of oppositional papers has grown enormously, with a 
production that operates both in government-held areas as well as in regions under the 
control of armed groups. Some of these papers are also produced in Turkey and then re-
distributed to the rebel-held territories. Higher quality publications have appeared, thanks 
to the financial and technical support of international media organisations. Many of these 
papers are published in local dialects or languages (e.g. Kurdish and Arabic) and target 
groups such as women, children, and religious minorities (De Angelis, Della Ratta et alia, 
2015).  
Among the numerous printed papers that have emerged, Sayedat Souria (The 
Lady of Syria) constitutes a meaningful voice. This magazine puts forward a vision 
outside the box of the revolution. The magazine is an advocacy paper in circulation since 
the beginning of 2014, which has been supported financially and technically by the 
French media organisations SMART and ASML. Printed in Gaziantep on the Turkish 
border with Syria – with a working plan to open branches also in the liberated areas – the 
paper has a distribution of five thousand copies in the liberated territories and two 
thousand copies in Syrian refugee camps. The magazine is also published online through 
Issuu, a digital publishing platform, along with Facebook and Twitter. Sayedat Souria 
represents the first paper in Syrian history to be dedicated to Syrian women with no 
political or religious orientation, aimed at raising women’s awareness about politics, 
society and justice by having women to address to and write about other women. Yasmine 
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Merei, editor in-chief of the magazine, affirms that before the revolt began people spoke 
only of one Syrian woman, Asma al-Asad, the president’s wife, the female icon of Syrian 
society.16 Now with the revolution, the magazine is substituting that icon with one that 
portrays all Syrian women, regardless of whether they are for or against the regime. The 
aim of paper is not to put forward a certain reading of the conflict or push to take side, 
but to focus on the pressing issues that Syrian women face today, whether they are living 
in refugee camps, rebel-held areas, regime-controlled neighbourhoods or  pushing to 
increase their representation in the Syrian National Coalition, limited to only 5 percent. 
The paper touches upon pressing issues for the female community, victims of a civil war 
and faced with problems like forced marriage of minors, childcare, environmental and 
food constraints. With violence perpetuated by the regime and by Islamist groupings 
alike, Sayedat Souria attempts to provide a perspective which differs from the monolithic 
narratives of the contending parts, with a glance at what could be a future Syria. 
 
 Radio 
After a first period of digital flourishing, radios have re-emerged as probably the 
most efficient way to reach local audiences inside Syria. Requiring only a cheap receiver 
and small battery, radios could easily be used across the country and could reach out to 
communities otherwise marginalised geographically. Radios have always constituted the 
best way to have access to news and they have proved very useful in times of war. Radio 
waves have the advantage of not having to pass checkpoints and frontiers and to reach 
areas under attack, offering the only possibility to receive news coverage of the event and 
of the outside world. Numerous radios have been established with foreign support in 
Turkey (both Istanbul and Gaziantep) or have their offices further abroad, like Rozana 
whose main office is in Paris. A number of transmission options are available: some 
15 
 
radios are only available online, while others broadcast both on short waves and online. 
In some cases, like Radio Fresh, a local radio station broadcasting from Kafranbel in Idlib 
province, they are available only to their local broadcast.  
In May 2015, at least 17 Syrian radio stations were broadcasting:17  
Name Main 
Office 
Distribution Website/Social media 
FRESH Kafranbel, Syria 90.0 FM (mainly 
Kafranbel) 
https://www.facebook.com7Ra-
dio.Frsh.90.00FM?fref=ts  
SOURIALI No main office-
operating from 
several cities: 
Marseille, Wash-
ington DC, Paris, 
Damascus 
Online presence + 
few hours of daily 
broadcast via 
Hawa mart 
https://www.facebook.com/Radio-
SouriaLI 
http://soundloud.com7souriali  
ANA Gaziantep, Tur-
key 
102. FM (mainly 
Aleppo) 
http://www.ana.fm/ar/  
AL-KUL Istanbul, Turkey 95.5 FM http://radioalkul.com  
HAWA SMART Gaziantep, Tur-
key 
103.2 FM https://facebook.com/hawasmartra-
dio  
ROZANA Paris, France 103.5 in Hama, 
Homs, Aleppo 
99.9 in Qalamoun 
http://rozana.fm 
YARMOUK 63 No main office 
(team working 
from Syria, Leb-
anon, Turkey) 
Online http://yarmouk63radio.weebly.com 
NASAEM SYRIA Gaziantep, Tur-
key 
98.5 FM (mainly 
Aleppo and Idlib) 
https://www.facebook.com/radio.na-
saem.syria/timeline  
HARA FM Gaziantep, Tur-
key 
99.9 FM (Minly 
Aleppo) 
https://www.facebook.com/radioha-
rafm?fref=ts  
8RBTNA FM Gaziantp, Turkey Online https://www.facebook.com/gher-
betna/info?tab=overview  
ARTA FM Gaziantep, Tur-
key 
99.5 (mostly Kurd-
ish areas: Amudah, 
amishli) 
https://www.facebook.com/artra-
dio?fref=ts 
http://www.arta.fm  
NAHDA FM No main office Online https://www.fa-
cebook.com/NahdaFm?fref=ts  
WATAN  Gaziantep, Tur-
key 
90.2 (Aleppo) 
90.3 (Idlib) 
https://www.facebook.com/fm.wa-
tan?fref=ts 
http:/watan.fm/ 
ALWAN Gaziantep, Tur-
key 
93.3 https://www.facebook.com/al-
wan6070?fref=ts 
www.alwan.fm 
Roo7 Gaziantep, Tur-
key 
92.7 (Aleppo) 
99.7 (Hama and 
Homs) 
https://www.facebok.com/Radio-
Roo7?fref=ts  
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These radios are the by-product of the current civil war, therefore designed to 
support those Syrians afflicted by military rule and suffering from economic restriction, 
as well as the numerous refugees, scattered across the country. Radio stations present 
entertainment programmes, music, cultural programmes and everything concerning daily 
life whether in regime or opposition-held areas. Both radios and TV channels that have 
emerged since the start of the conflict, offer an agenda of “social programming”, meaning 
that they focus on reporting on and for a population affected by a war, offering debates, 
advice and discussing possible solutions to daily life problems, like power-cuts, lack of 
water and gas, how to cook with food shortage (De Angelis, Della Ratta et alia, 2015). 
They are also presenting cultural programmes based on the revival of Syrian history, 
culture, music, dialect and food. A very good example is represented by Radio SouriaLi, 
an Internet-based radio broadcasting from October 2012, born from a project of a group 
of Syrians with different ethnic, religious and intellectual backgrounds, based inside and 
outside Syria. Caroline Ayoub, an activist who had been detained by the regime and one 
of the main contributors of the radio show, explains how the name “SouriaLi” sums up 
the current situation in her country. It is a play on words, which combines “sourialia”, 
meaning surrealism, with “souria li”, meaning “Syria for me”, in order to refer to the 
surrealistic condition that Syria is experiencing and the need for all Syrians to come 
together to build a new Syria.18 Caroline Ayoub affirms that the radio is trying to sew up 
the wounds of the war and reunite Syrians in the name of their rich cultural heritage. This 
is done through a number of programmes, like “Ayam el Lulu” (Good Old Days) in which 
well-known episodes of Syrian history are celebrated; “Fattoush”, (a traditional Syrian 
salad dish), which airs a 15-minute cooking show on traditional food recipes; or 
“Hakawati Souria”, a 20-minute program on traditional storytelling.19 Radio SouriaLi is 
the expression of one among the many radio programs that are showing how life in Syria 
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endures and preserves the great culture of its people. Radio SouriaLi is the most 
successful Syrian media project, with 500,000 returning visitors to the website each 
month, 200,000 playbacks on their sound cloud account and 4 million on-line listeners 
(Marrouch, 2014). The radio broadcasts for three hours a day in Syria, using equipment 
and broadcasting capacity provided by Hawa Smart in Hama, Homs, Damascus, Latakia, 
and Aleppo. 
Another example of a successful radio station is Radio Fresh, though very 
different with regards to its reach and quality. Founded in 2013, Radio Fresh was 
established by a group of media activists in Kafranbel, Idlib province, as a community-
radio, which could cover local issues that were relevant for its local audience. As Rima 
Marrouch reports through the words of a Syrian researcher living in Gaziantep, “the 
success of Radio Fresh is that they really speak about issues that touch Kafranbel’s 
residents. For example, fixing the local power plant or distribution of humanitarian aid in 
town. They don’t speak about the Iranian nuclear program or international affairs, stories 
that people can follow in mainstream Arabic-language media outlets”. The funding of 
these radio stations is difficult to track as most of the operators have shown a certain 
degree of discretion with regards to disclosing the names of the donors they rely on and 
the level of resource they deploy. Such level of transparency seems, at times, to infringe 
those same values preached by these radios. Despite the difficulties, two main options 
appear to regulate the sector: donor funding and a more self-generated funding mix 
(Marrouch, 2014). 
The panorama on Syrian radios would not be complete without mentioning other 
less promising examples of media outlets. In fact along with the broadcasting of radios 
trying to provide a non-partisan report on the conflict, there are less successful cases of 
radios channelling hateful messages. This may appear under different forms, like telling 
stories of mothers sending their children to take up arms to fight the regime, or chanting 
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songs encouraging young people to join the battle or simply merging news coverage with 
propaganda and sensationalism. If these trends are determined by a conflict that has 
overwhelmed everyone and where detachment is at times difficult to put in practice, in 
other cases radios are consciously transformed into tools to propagate fear and hate. With 
the emergence of the Islamic State within Syrian borders, radios have also become a 
means of unorthodox jihadi propaganda. This is the case of radio Al-Bayan, established 
by the Islamic State after the size of the city of Raqqa in January 2014 (Marrouch, 2014). 
This radio broadcasts daily news about the advancement of the Islamic State, reads out 
political statements and describes the benefits of those living under the Islamic law. 
Though the broadcast of radios like Al-Bayan are limited to the territories under the 
control of the Islamic State, it represents an alarming sign, that the enthusiasm and 
creativity that characterised the beginning of the uprising, has made the way to a more 
complex reality, where media outlets can be sources for community building as well as 
be carrier of deleterious effects, causing an escalation of violence and hate speech. 
 
Satellite TV 
Satellite TV channels have played a fundamental role in the Syrian conflict, for 
their capacity to give news a wider reach and to bring people, in Syria and abroad, face-
to-face with the reality of the war. If Internet, radio and newspapers were already 
contrasting the regime's monopoly of information, satellite TV was somehow a stronger 
weapon for its extensive popularity among people and the power that images and videos 
provoked in people's imaginary. However, satellite TV channels have not emerged with 
the same rhythm of radio stations, due to their high operational costs. Two satellite 
channels, Orient TV and Barada TV, created before the uprising and based abroad, 
transformed the already existing anti-regime orientation into an explicit anti-regime 
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opposition, adopting the discourse of the revolution. This was followed by the creation of 
up to nine opposition broadcasting channels, among which Souria Al-Shaab (Syrian 
People), Souria Al-Ghad (Syria Tomorrow), 18th of March Channel and Aleppo Today.  
Despite the controversies regarding the financial support it received, Barada TV 
played a fundamental role in the years leading up to the revolt and in those that followed 
it (Withlock, 2011). This London-based TV channel, funded in 2008 by a group of Syrian 
expatriates with a low-budget production, covered topics that were taboo within Syria, 
often with explicit anti-regime stances and political debates usually left out of Syria’s 
national channels. As soon as the first protests and manifestations started, the channel 
gave wide coverage of the events. It started streaming YouTube videos that protestors 
had posted online, inaugurating a technique that characterised the news coverage on Syria 
of most of the established international news networks. Beside the use of exclusive 
footages, the channel also relied on open debates, where people were able to call in and 
express their opinions, opening a venue for critical thinking and civic engagement.  
However, the most significant development in the Syrian media war between 
opposition and regime came when the government of Saudi Arabia and Qatar decided to 
use their media assets, respectively al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera, to hasten Asad's demise 
(Al-Abdeh, 2012). Though this happen when the uprising had already taken to the streets 
in massive numbers, this drift revolutionised the media landscape on the Syrian conflict, 
in terms of information available and for the strong influence the two channels have on 
public opinion (Abu Khalil, 2011). The two channels, founded by members of the Qatari 
and Saudi royal families, respectively, had won the hearts of the Arab audience by 
introducing a new type of journalism inspired by Western values of professionalism, 
accountability, precision and independent thinking. When the uprising in Tunisia broke 
out, these channels played a fundamental role in advertising the local protest as the 
expression of a broader Arab story of popular uprising. This facilitated the spread of the 
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protests from one country to another, as part of a common framework, something that 
would have hardly been possible without the unifying media narrative. Unfortunately the 
type of professionalism which they praised was strongly undermined in the coverage of 
the Syrian conflict, serving the interests of their patrons and local proxies. This contrasted 
with the coverage of state television, which resisted reforms and became a weapon in the 
hands of the security apparatus and the old regime (Lynch, 2015). Unfortunately, as 
pointed out by Marc Lynch, the partisan tone adopted by national and transnational 
broadcasting had a debilitating effect on the fate of the uprising, fading the enthusiasm of 
its early days and contributing to internal divisions and to its enduring war stagnation 
(Lynch, 2015). 
 
 Phase 3. Media professionalisation and war stagnation 
 The revolution of the first days has by now entered a new phase, with new 
participants joining the conflict and a civil war taking over the country. With the fall of 
the regime not expected to happen any time soon, and with the radical Islamist guerrillas 
taking control over large swaths of the country, the media sector also moved into a new 
phase, which can be identified beginning at the start of 2013. Syrian media developed in 
terms of professionalism and widened their sphere of production. Despite the war, media 
centres and media professionals were working with higher standards of professionalism, 
inspired by Western models and supported by foreign media support programmes. This 
type of support to local journalists and media activists was conceived as necessary to keep 
news from Syria flowing, as international reporters had been barred from or had restricted 
access to the country, leaving local journalists as the only newsgatherers to Syria’s war. 
Media development, intended to provide material support, technical assistance, training 
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and financial support to media centres and activists, grew enormously, to an extent that it 
resembled an industry (Stanley, 2007). 
Media development programmes became a pillar in the international response to 
the ongoing Syrian crisis, with a number of actors involved in the media assistance, from 
governments, to multilateral organisations and a large number of national and 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The US government and EU are 
two of the main donors, which entrust the projects to a vast number of implementers like 
BBC Media Action, Internews Europe, the National Democratic Institute, HIVOS,  Free 
Press Unlimited, Canal France International, l’Association du Soutien aux Médias Libres 
(ASML), and AVAAZ. These projects are usually carried out in Syria’s neighbouring 
countries, with Turkey being the main host. Gaziantep, a city on the Turkish-Syrian 
border, has become the hub for media organisations that have established their office and 
operate trainings, workshops for Syrian media activists. Here they learn the basics of 
journalism and video shooting, they are provided with broadcast equipment to use for the 
news coverage. Some become themselves trainers who return to Syria to teach others 
media skills and provide them with the necessary equipment, in some cases establishing 
media centres in the different governorates. The protracted conflict and deteriorating 
situation inside Syria has forced media support projects to return working on traditional 
media, principally radios and newspapers, which could reach areas under siege. These 
programmes are specifically designed to respond to the needs produced by a crisis that 
has left people without houses, reduced many to being refugees across the country and in 
the region, confined others in refugee camps, while sectarian strife and the terror caused 
by the prospect of an Islamist takeover  is spreading across the country.  
One of the main initiatives of this phase is represented by the formation of 
platforms fulfilling the critical task of mediating between the online production of news 
and the public: checking the contents, contextualizing the events and verifying their 
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authenticity. One example is the Damascus Bureau, a news platform where independent 
journalists and inexperienced media activists can publicise their articles, have them 
translated, and receive comments from experts and the public.20  
Other types of initiatives gather news and videos provided by activists in the field, 
verifying, and contextualising raw material into useable footage, which is then distributed 
to international media. One example is offered by the citizen press group ANA News 
Media Association, a Cairo-based network of journalists providing training and 
equipment to media activists working in Syria, with support from private donors and EU 
funding.21 ANA, co-funded by the British-Syrian journalist Rami Jarrah, offers Syrian 
activists clandestine training and equipment usually smuggled through the Lebanese 
border. The organisation has grown substantially, reaching a network of 350 Syrians who 
file news from across the country.22  
Of a different nature is the platform Syrian Media, funded by the media activist 
Monis Bokhari. It constitutes a database of the different headlines that have appeared 
since the outbreak of the revolution and a connection between these different media 
platforms.23 Monis Bukhari, also funder of the online radio Baladna (our country), holds 
that the objective is to create a common language for Syrian journalism, which is based 
on more professionalism on behalf of journalists and more collaboration among them (De 
Angelis, 2014). All of these initiatives testify to an epochal change of the Syrian media 
landscape, which is strongly dependent on the Internet as its main platform. The 
emergence of these organizations charged with the selection and publication of news, 
guarantees higher reliability and more relevance to news, as opposed to what was a 
chaotic, if not piecemeal, uploading of news by activists on social media.  
Despite these initiatives, aimed at portraying a more balanced picture of the Syrian 
crisis, one that stands on authentic and verifiable news, a large section of news outlets are 
still lacking professional rigour and ethical responsibility, adopting highly partisan 
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narratives, which serve specific state authorities/factions or political aims. This picture 
refers to both national and international media outlets, which driven by higher political 
and strategic purposes have contributed to the marketization of fear, the sectarianization 
of the conflict and the demonization of specific minorities. This means, as Lynch points 
out, that if the media played a prominent role in enabling the outbreak of the uprising, the 
fragmentation in the media coverage that followed also transformed it into a vehicle for 
proxy warfare by regional powers and encouraged the logic of violence (Lynch, 2015). 
For instance, the emphasis that has been put on the sectarian nature of the Syrian civil 
war, whether by the regime, some opposition groups or regional state actors, has been 
employed and manipulated by the different parties operating on the ground to serve their 
political aims. The Syrian regime has inevitably stressed the sectarian nature of the 
conflict to justify its repression against rebel forces and its call for national unity against 
the takfiri Islamist threat. Regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, have embarked 
on their part in a proxy war that has taken also place through competing media channels 
and networks. 
 
Isis and the Cyber Caliphate 
The analysis of the Syrian mediascape would not be complete without mentioning 
the hi-tech jihadi war directed by the so-called Islamic State in the third phase of the 
Syrian conflict. Despite the retrograde aim of restoring an Islamic caliphate over the 
territories of Iraq and Syria, harking back to the religious and political state that succeeded 
the Prophet Muhammad's death (632 CE), the new Islamic state or as Jean-Pierre Filiu 
defines it the “Deep State”, is anything but retrograde in terms of the sophisticated media 
campaign it launches.24 ISIS has invested enormously in its marketing strategy, proving 
to have improved greatly since the "fuzzy, monotonous camcorder sermons" of a decade 
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ago Osama bin Laden's use of the media (Rose, 2014). ISIS global media operation makes 
use of YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr and other social media to instil fear, discredit 
and stir hatred against its enemies  (i.e. Iran and Shi‘a groups), provoke the US and its 
allies and recruit from outside the Middle East. The group has also founded al-Hayat 
Media Centre, a broadcaster aimed at non-Arabic speakers, with programmes shaped on 
the model of Western TV channels, streaming in several languages, with the intent of 
showing the perfect life existence of those living within the confines of the Islamic 
Caliphate.  
Differently from the dreadful video footages showing the brutality of the group 
when killing Western hostages or different ethnic and religious groups facing their 
military advance,  other videos circulate on the mujdatweets, few-minutes videos under 
the shape of a jihadi travel show, showing colourful scenes of street life, children at 
playground or eating an ice cream, with people joyfully coming up to the camera to 
express the security and peace that the "land of the Khalifah" offers, saying "We don't 
need any democracy, we don't need any communism or anything like that, all we need is 
shari‘a" (Rose, 2015). The Western origin of many of its fighters is revealed by the 
professional audio and visual techniques being used as well as by the expressions of 
ostentation and pride that the fashion of shooting selfies has produced through Islamic 
fighters (Diab, 2015). Sadly, these "poster boys", posing in Rambo-like selfies and 
circulating through ISIS's followers social networks, beside questioning the religious 
"legality" (haram vs. halal) of these photos, are proving to find the way to future recruits' 
hearts.  
The emergence of ISIS further complicates the conflict in Syria, presenting a third 
contending party in the already fragmented conflict and deepening the crisis.  However,  
beside the actual brutality of the group, experienced by all those falling under its 
authority, the group is also waging a war that trespasses the borders of the presumed 
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Islamic caliphate, reaching Western countries through cyberspace and undermining 
fundamental questions about the idea of territorial sovereignty. ISIS' "electronic war", 
waged against Europe and the US, is threatening Western computing systems, hacking 
business and government websites and provoking serious economic and national 
challenges. Examples as the one occurred in April 2015, where ISIS hacked the French 
Television network TV5 Monde, preventing it from broadcasting for three hours and 
controlling its social media accounts on Twitter and Facebook.  
This confirms that the media are ductile tools, they can serve popular democratic 
movements, authoritarian governments and terrorist organisations alike. In this regard, it 
is necessary to stress how the alarming expansion of the Islamic state or of the so called 
“caliphate” has not just occurred through Syrian and Iraqi territories but also through the 
virtual world. It is in the cyberspace that the power of the caliphate is rooted. Here, digital 
platforms have become the main pool of recruits who discover not only ISIS, but as Adam 
Shatz argues on the London Review of Books, Islam itself (Shatz, 2015). Indeed digital 
media have paradoxically bridged the gap between two crises of citizenship: the exclusion 
of young Muslim in Europe and the exclusion of Sunnis in Syria and Iraq (Shatz, 2015). 
Therefore the impact of the new media in the Syrian conflict has to be carefully weighted 
and diversified according to the specific player and audience to which it appeals, as they 
can equally breach gaps between atomised citizens and drive regime changes or gather 
disfranchised people inebriated by fanaticism and violence. 
 
Conclusion 
The role and development of the new media in Syria has been a revolution within 
a revolution. Social networking sites, web-aggregators, TV channels, satellite stations, 
radios, online and printed newspapers, magazines, have emerged in the midst of the 
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revolt, eager to replace what had been the official and meagre news diet that the Syrian 
regime had offered thus far. It was the combination of old and new media, online and 
offline protests that marked the success of the media campaign. If, on the one hand, 
activists opened new webpages and uploaded videos reporting on the brutality of the 
regime, on the other hand, there were underground newspapers distributed in rebel-held 
areas, radio stations operating from neighbouring countries that reached the Syrian 
airwave space and satellite TV channels spreading the news of Syrian social network to 
an international audience. All of this amplified the capacity of the movement and the 
reaching of its message across the population.  
The events, à la Alain Badiou, unfolding in Syria have been influenced by the 
media in all its phases and aspects, to an extent that it would be very difficult to think of 
the Syrian uprising separately from the media. Based on these assumptions, this paper 
analyses the diversified role that the new media technologies have played during the 
course of the Syrian uprising – from its early days to the current civil war – identifying 
the actors employing them, the strategies used and the impact they produced on the 
development of the conflict. Specifically, the paper argues that the Syrian media scene 
experienced three major phases in its development: the emergence of alternative sources 
of information through the digital space that acted as catalysts, mobilisers and organisers 
of the popular movement; the evolution from media activism to citizen journalism and 
finally what we are now witnessing the professionalisation and diversification of the 
media sphere within a state of war stagnation. 
 Analysing the role of the media in the Syrian conflict is important for a number 
of different reasons. The most evident one is that with the spark of the Syrian revolt, the 
monopoly of information held by the Syrian regime crumbled with citizens’ access and 
employment of the new media technologies. These tools do not simply offer a new and 
diversified news panorama, but they set platforms where interaction and coordination 
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occur, where common actions are organised and where everyone, government included, 
are asked to be accountable for their actions. The new information technologies damage 
the regime’s longevity and stability by putting an end to the regime’s control over the 
flow of information and people’s interaction. Moreover, the Syrian conflict becomes the 
expression of another important phenomenon, namely that the new media have not simply 
increased the opportunities for social movements to emerge, but they have changed the 
way conflicts are fought, becoming at the same time tools to inform and weapons to 
attack. Today the media are not just tools to spread information, but to “perform” in the 
conflict (Zelizer, 2007). This entails that nowadays conflicts are not simply fought on the 
ground with heavy artillery but online, with real electronic armies fighting over the 
control of space, power and language. Through the virtual allies of the cyberspace 
contentious action takes place, contesting factions spy over the enemy’s virtual activities 
and inflict heavy blows with a simple click of the mouse. And yet the role of the new 
media in the Syrian conflict has not simply empowered citizens against authoritarian 
ruling and duplicated the conflict in a real and virtual dimension but it has produced a 
new type of journalism, less professional but incredibly more vivid and crude. If the 
Vietnam War was the first televised war and the Gulf War the first 24/7 cable war, the 
Syrian conflict is the first social media war. Lynch defines it as the “most socially 
mediated civil conflict in history”, with a range of videos, information and discourses 
flowing from Syria that is unprecedented and at times, ungovernable (Lynch, Freelon et 
alia, 2014). The abundance of messages and the emergence of new guerrilla groups has 
complicated the news panorama, with each group trying to control the message.  
Images and live footages have dominated the news coverage of the Syrian revolt since its 
onset and have profoundly affected its development. Some images are now glued in our 
collective memory, like the massacre of Izra’, near Dera’a on April 22 of 2011 and the 
picture of an anguished father carrying the dead body of his son, who had been shot in 
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the head (Al-Abdeh, 2012). The videos of the singer Ibrahim Qashush who gathered 
thousands in the streets of Hama by tuning the song “Come on, Bashar, leave!” (yallah, 
irhal ya Bashar!) and who was found dead in a river with his throat cut, is another 
symbolic icon (Shadid, 2011); and even more, the rows of dead children heaped up after 
the chemical attack in East Ghouta province in August 2013 (Mahmoud, Chulov, 2013). 
Daunting videos and images like these have encouraged Syrians to participate and have 
shaped the world’s understanding of the violent repression of peaceful protestors by the 
Syrian regime. Equally shocking videos like the one of the rebel commander eating the 
heart of a fallen enemy, have proved how the enduring state of war and devastating 
humanitarian catastrophe is dis-humanising, on whichever side they occur.25   
Eventually the mediatisation that has been done of the Syrian conflict has brought 
in every home images of the war, bringing foreign audiences closer to the conflict and to 
the catastrophe of the refugee crisis that the war has created. The rise of citizen journalists 
and their performance with new media is progressively changing the nature and the limits 
of journalism, extending “journalists authority in questionable ways” (Zelizer, 2007). If 
on the one hand the media coverage offered by citizen journalists can be criticised for 
being imbued with political value and militant language, on the other hand one should 
also question the agenda of international media outlets that collect the material uploaded 
by citizens journalists to build a narrative serving the interests of their patrons, local 
proxies or simply at the mercy of the market. This means that this type of media, instead 
of giving voice to the voiceless as it was the case at the onset of the uprising, is once again 
the expression of bigger and stronger actors/countries that in order to pursue their political 
agenda, focus their coverage on sensationalism, inciting hatred against political 
adversaries and deepening ethnic and religious divisions. This suggests that the media are 
powerful tools, which can be equally effective to encourage collective action and drive 
popular mobilisations as they can produce fear, resentment and divisions (Lynch, 2015). 
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The recent catastrophe of Syrian refugees fleeing their country and embarking on 
an unknown journey is assigning the media the decisive role of documenting the crisis 
and calling for the international community to act promptly. When the image of a dead 
Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi, in September of 2015, washed ashore the coastal city of Bodrum 
in Turkey, appeared on social media and on international newspapers, this has not simply 
questioned the ethics of journalism, but has more importantly reminded the international 
community that the Syrian crisis has not ended, thus is widening and coming closer to 
Europe with the calamity of its refugees fleeing the war. The image has provoked an 
unprecedented involvement of civil society actors around European countries, rallying in 
the streets and pushing their governments to provide temporary asylum to the many 
Syrian refugees, a fact that per se shows the unprecedented potentialities that the new 
media have in changing society and politics. And yet the role of the media does not 
terminate here. The Syrian revolt, which seems to have succumbed to a self-perpetuating 
war, still lives in the heart of its people. Once it is over, the new media will have to take 
part in a much harder task: sewing the wounds that the violence caused by sectarian, 
religious and political divides has provoked during these years of civil war.26  
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